University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
Volume 10
1977

Reprisal Discharges of Union Officials
Alan V. Reuther
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons, and the Legislation Commons

Recommended Citation
Alan V. Reuther, Reprisal Discharges of Union Officials, 10 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 274 (1977).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr/vol10/iss2/5

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform at
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

REPRISAL DISCHARGES OF UNION OFFICIALS
Title I of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
(LMRDA) 1 guarantees certain fundamental rights to all union
members. 2 In addition, section 609 of the LMRDA makes it unlawful for a labor organization to discipline its members for exercising
any of these rights. 3 These provisions may be enforced by civil
action in federal district court. 4
In order to represent their members properly, labor unions
employ a large number of officers and employees. 5 The union
membership elects certain officers, 6 who generally have the power,
either explicitly under the union constitution or implicitly as part of
their executive discretion, to appoint and dismiss subordinate officers and employees. As a result, the elected officers are able to
dispense these appointive positions as a form of political patronage. 7

29 U .S.C. §§ 401-53] (1970),
Title I of the LMRDA is entitled, "Bill of Rights of Members of Labor Organizations."
It provides that members of labor organizations shall have equal rights and privileges,
freedom of speech and assembly. freedom from arbitrary increases in dues and assessments.
freedom to sue, and certain due process safeguards against improper disciplinary action. 29
U.S.C. 41 l(a)(l)-(5) (1970).
3
29 U.S.C. § 529 (1970) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any labor organization, or any officer, agent, shop steward,
or other representative of a iabor organization, or any employee thereof to fine,
suspend, expel. or otherwise discipline any of its members for exercising any right
to which he is entitled under the provisions of this Act. ...
4
29 u.s.c. § 412 (1970) ..
5
In 1971, labor organizations employed over 28,000 people. Roughly a third of these
employees were clerical and secretarial personnel, while half were organizers or staff
representatives. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 1312-9,
EMPLOYMENT AND EARNING STATISTICS 1900-1972, at 685 (1973); U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR
STASTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, DIRECTORY OF NATIONAL UNIONS AND EMPLOYER Assoc,ATIONS 88-91 (1971). In addition to their national and local officers, unions also employ
administrative assistants, staff representatives, organizers, and other professional and clerical employees. These employees negotiate collective bargaining agreements, service existing contracts, process grievances, recruit new members, adjust internal disputes, and
perform other administrative duties. They also play a significant role in internal union
politics, usually by supporting the policies and' candidacies of the incumbent union officers.
See Note, Union Officers and Employee-Members: Reprisal Dischar!(es As Unlawful Discipline Under Section 609 of the LMRDA, 6 GA. L. REV. 564, 569-72 (1972). See generally
J. BARBASH, AMERICAN UNIONS; STRUCTURE, GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 31, 38-41,
55-63, 81-83, 86-88 (1967); W. LEISERSON, AMERICAN TRADE UNION DEMOCRACY 237-39
(1959).
6 Title IV of the LMRDA requires that officers of local, national, and international unions
be elected by the membership. 29 U.S.C. § 481 (1970).
1 See Note, supra note 5, at 569-70. See generally J. BARBASH, supra note 5, at 82, 99; W.
LEISERSON, supra note 5.
I
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Usually union officers and employees are also members of their
union. 8 The dual status of officer-members and employee-members
places them in a unique situation under the LMRDA. As union
members, they are entitled to the rights enumerated in Title I. As
union officers and employees, however, they serve at the pleasure
of their superiors. This situation raises the question whether officer- and employee-members have a cause of action under the
LMRDA when they are discharged in retaliation for exercising
rights protected under Title 1. 9 Resolution of this question depends
upon whether or not such reprisal discharges violate the provisions
of Title I or constitute unlawful discipline within the meaning of
section 609 . 10 After discussing the judicial decisions dealing with
these questions, this article will examine the various policy considerations and will suggest an analysis for resolving the problem.

I. THE JUDICIAL DECISIONS

The federal courts are divided with respect to whether the
LMRDA protects officer- and employee-members from reprisal

8
Union constitutions often require that officers and employees also be members of the
union. See e.g., CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED AUTO WORKERS art. 10, §§ 2, 6; art. 14, §
3; art. 38, § 3 (1974).
9
Section 103 of the LMRDA explicitly provides that Title I does not preempt any rights
and remedies that union members may have under state law or under the constitution and
bylaws of their union. 29 U.S.C. § 413 (1970). Consequently, union officials who are
discharged in retaliation for exercising rights protected under Title I may have a cause of
action under state law. See generally Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64
HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1971). This article, however, will only examine whether the LMRDA
provides a remedy to these deposed union officials, not whether state law provides a
remedy. Although this issue is occasionally phrased in terms of whether the federal courts
have jurisdiction to consider complaints dealing with reprisal discharges, the question is
actually whether officer- or employee-members have a cause of action under § 102 of the
LMRDA when they are discharged for exercising rights enumerated in Title I. but their
status as union members is not disturbed. See Sheridan v. United Bhd. of Carpenters Local
626. 306 F.2d 152. 156 (3d Cir. 1962).
10
The fiduciary obligations imposed on union officials under Title V of the LMRDA. 29
U.S.C. §§ 501-504 (1970). encompass the protection of the political rights of all union
members. as well as the proper handling of money and property. See Semancik v. UMW.
District 5, 466 F.2d 144, 155 (3d Cir. 1972); Bakery & Confectionary Workers lnt'I Union.
335 F.2d 691, 695-96 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Retail Clerks Local 648 v. Retail Clerks lnt'I Ass'n,
299 F. Supp: 1012, 1021-22 (D.D.C. 1969). See generally Sabolsky v. Budzanoski. 457 F.2d
1245, 1250-51 (3d Cir. 1972); Johnson v. Nelson, 325 F.2d 646, 650-51 (8th Cir. 1963).
Reprisal discharges. therefore. may also violate the provisions of Title V. Title V suits
generate pressures for settlement. because the union officers are liable for damages and
attorney fees in their individual capacities. Consequently, a deposed officer- or employeemember may prefer to sue under Title V rather than under Title I or§ 609. The ramifications
of proceeding under Title V are beyond the scope of this article. See Leslie. Federal Courts
and Union Fiduciaries, 76 CoLUM. L. REV. 1314 (1976).
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discharges. The Second, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have
held that these union officials may not be removed from their
positions for exercising rights protected under Title I. 11 In contrast, the Third and Fifth Circuits have concluded that such reprisal
discharges do not violate the LMRDA. 12 District courts considering this issue have been similarly divided. 13
A. Decisions Finding No Violation of the LMRDA
In Sheridan v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters Local 626, 14

the Third Circuit Court of Appeals decided that the business agent
of a local union, who was removed from his elected office by a vote
of the membership because he brought criminal charges against
another member, was not entitled to reinstatement or damages.
Stating that it is the ''union-member relationship, not the unionofficer or union-employee relationship, that is protected," 15 Judge
Kalodner held that the business agent did not have a remedy under
sections IOl(a)(4) or 609. 16 Relying upon the language and legisla-

11
Gabauer v. Woodcock, 520 F.2d 1084 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1061
(1976); Wood v. Dennis. 489 F.2d 849 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960 (1974);
Schonfeld v. Penza. 477 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1973); Grand Lodge, Int') Ass'n of Machinists v.
King, 335 F.2d 340 (9th Cir. 1964). cert. denied, 379 U.S. 920 (1964); Salzhandler v. Caputo,
316 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1963). cert. denied, 375 U.S. 946 (1963).
12 Wambles v. International Bhd. of Teamsters. 488 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1974) (percuriam);
Sewell v. Grand Lodge. Int'! Ass'n of Machinists, 445 F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1971). cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1024 (1972); Sheridan v. United Bhd. of Carpenters Local 626. 306 F.2d 152 (3d
Cir. 1962).
13
The following courts have held that reprisal discharges do not violate the LMRDA:
Collins v. Pennsylvania Telephone Union Local 1944, 418 F. Supp. 50 (W.D. Pa. 1976);
Sipe v. Local 191, United Bhd. of Carpenters, 393 F. Supp. 865 (M.D. Pa. 1975); Rosser v.
Laborers' Int'I Union Local 438, 381 F. Supp. 605 (N.D. Ga. 1974); Russo v. Local 676,
United Ass'n of Plumbing & Pipefitting Indus., 372 F. Supp. 1265 (D. Conn. 1974); Keene v.
Ice Mach. Independent Employees Ass'n, 331 F. Supp. 1355 (M.D. Pa. 1971); International Bhd. of Electrical Workers Local I 186 v. Eli, 307 F. Supp. 495 (D. Hawaii 1969).
The following courts have held that reprisal discharges violate the LMRDA: Price v.
UMW, 376 F. Supp. 1015 (D.D.C. 1974); Needham v. Isbister, 84 L.R.R.M. 2105 (D. Mass.
1973); Yablonski v. UMW. 80 L.R.R.M. 3435 (D.D.C. 1972); Paley v. Greenberg, 73
L.R.R.M. 2509 (S.D. N.Y. 1970); Retail Clerks Local 648 v. Retail Clerks lnt'I Ass'n, 299 F.
Supp. 1012 (D.D.C. 1969); DeCampli v. Greeley, 293 F. Supp. 746(O.N.J. 1%8); Gulickson
v. Forest, 290 F. Supp. 457 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (dictum); George v. Bricklayers lnt'l Union,
255 F. Supp. 239 (E.D. Wis. 1966); Moschetta v. Cross, 46 L.R.R.M. 2810 (D.D.C. 1%0);
Alvino v. Bakery Workers' lnt'I Union, 46 L:R.R.M. 2812 (D.D.C. 1960).
14
306 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1962).
15
Id. at 157.
16
Id. at 156-59. Concurring in the result reached by Judge Kalodner, Judge Hastie held
that the action was premature because the business agent had failed to exhaust his internal
union remedies. Id. at 159-60. Although the opinion of Judge Kalodner in Sheridan represented the views of only a single judge, the Third Circuit has subsequently indicated in
dicta that it adheres to his position. In Martire v. Laborers' Local 1058, 410 F.2d 32, 35 (3d
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 903 (1969), the court interpreted Sheridan as holding that
neither Title I nor § 609 affords a remedy to a union official who is removed from office
prior to the expiration of his term. Similarly, in Harrison v. Local 54, American Fed'n of
State. County, and Mun. Employees, 518 F.2d 1276. 1281, 1284 (3d Cir. 1975), the court
cited Sheridan for the proposition that the LMRDA does not provide relief to a union official
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tive history of the LMRDA to justify this conclusion, he observed
that the rights enumerated in Title I are described as the rights of
union "members," and that no mention is made of the rights of
union officers or employees. 1 7 Moreover, he noted that the word
"officer" was deleted from section 10 I (a)( 4) by the Conference
Committee. 18 Judge Kalodner also argued that the term "discipline" in section 609 should not be construed to encompass removal
from union office, since the three sanctions which are specifically
enumerated in that section-fine, suspension, and expulsion-all
involve interference with a member's status as a member. 19
Observing that the basic purpose of the LMRDA is to promote
union self-government and union democracy, Judge Kalodner
noted that the business agent had been removed by a vote of the
membership. 2 ° Furthermore, Judge Kalodner asserted that there
was no meaningful distinction between whether the business agent
was acting as an individual member or in an official capacity when
he brought criminal charges against his fellow member. Recognizing that an officer's conduct, whether in an individual or official
capacity, may significantly affect his ability to maintain the respect
of the membership and to function effectively as an officer, Judge
Kalodner concluded that an intolerable situation would be created
if the membership could not remove an officer in whom they had
lost confidence. 21

for suspension from office or termination of employment. Since Sheridan involved only
§ I0l(a}(4), however, the dicta in Martire and Harrison are overly broad.
17 306 F.2d at 156. Judge Kalodner also noted that Title I is entitled "Bill of Rights of
Members of Labor Organizations." Contrasting the use of the word "member" in Title I
with the numerous references in Title IV to the rights of "any bona fide candidate." Judge
Kalodner argued that Congress knew how to use appropriate language when it wanted to
grant protection to a special category of union members. Id. at 156-57. It is also noteworthy
that Congress provided separate definitions for the terms "member" and "officer, agent,
shop steward, or other representative." 29 U.S.C. § 402 (3)(o) and (q) (1970).
18
306 F.2d at 156-57. The version of § I0l(a)(4) which the Senate originally passed
provided that labor organizations could not limit the right of any "member or officer" to
sue. S. 155, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § I0l(a)(4} (1959), reprinted in I NLRB, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT, at 520 (1959).
The House version, however, did not contain the words "or officers." H.R. 8400. 86th
Cong., ]st Sess. § 10l(a)(4) (1959), reprinted in I NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT, at 630 (1959). In analyzing the
differences between the House and Senate bills, Senator Goldwater declared that "the
Senate bill extends protection of the right to sue expressly to union officers." 105 CONG.
REc. 16487 (1959). The Conference Committee adopted the House version, H.R. REP. No.
I L47, 86th Cong., I st Sess. 31 (1959), reprinted in I NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT, at 935 (1959). Consequently,
§ I0l(a}(4) encompasses only the right of "members" to sue. See generally 306 F.2d at
156.
19
306 F.2d at 156.
20
306 F.2d at 158-59. Judge Kalodner mentioned that§ 401(h) of the LMRDA. 29 U.S.C.
§ 481(h) (1970), provides for removal of wrongdoing union officials by secret ballot vote of
the membership.
21
306 F.2d at 157-59.
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In dissent, Judge McLaughlin argued that the business agent had
a remedy under sections 101 (a)(4) and 609. Judge McLaughlin
stressed that the business agent was removed from office for exercising his right as an individual member to sue, not for misconduct
in his official capacity. Viewing the phrase "otherwise discipline"
in section 609 as a catchall provision designed to encompass unusual sanctions such as removal from office, 22 Judge McLaughlin
contended that the form of the sanction should not obscure the fact
that the business agent was disciplined for exercising a membership right protected under Title I. 23
The Fifth Circuit has also accepted the view that reprisal discharges do not violate the LMRDA. In Sewell v. Grand Lodge,
International Association of Machinists, 24 the court decided that a
grand lodge representative who was discharged from his appointed
position for opposing a proposed amendment to the union's constitution was not entitled to relief. 25 Although the court held that
the suit was barred by the Alabama statute of limitations, 26 in
dictum it stated that the dismissal of the grand lodge representative
did not violate sections lOl(a)(l), IOl(a)(2), or 609, because he was
guilty of insubordination. 27
The Sewell court recognized that union members do not forfeit
their rights under the LMRDA upon election or appointment to
union office. 28 Nevertheless, the court contended that it would be
unreasonable to permit a member to enjoy the salary and prestige
of union employment and simultaneously to "completely subvert
the purposes of his employment by engaging in activities diametrically opposed to the performance of his specified duties. " 29 The
court stated that all employees owe a basic loyalty to their
employer and at times must subordinate their personal opinons to
22
The plain meaning of the word "discipline" would seem to encompass removal. from
union office, even if the union office is regarded as a privilege. rather than as a right.
23
306 F.2d at 161-65. Judge McLaughlin also pointed out that the membership of the local
merely voted on the type of sanction that should be imposed on the business agent, and
not whether he was guilty of violating the union constitution. Id. at 165.
24 445 F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1971). cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1024 (1972).
25 The executive council of the union had instructed all staff representatives to support the
proposed amendment, which would have eliminated the requirement that all amendments to
the union's constitution be approved by a referendum of the membership. The grand lodge
representative opposed the proposed amendment in conversations with individual members,
and the president of the union discharged him for insubordination. Id. at 547-48, nn.5, 7 & 8.
26 Id. at 550. The court found that the cause of action was governed by Alabama's one
year statute of limitations for torts, not the six year statute of limitations for contracts. For a
critique of this decision, see Note, supra note 5, at 591-92.
27 445 F.2d at 550-52. The court limited the dictum to the particular facts and circumstances of the case. Id. at 552.
28 Id. at 550. l)lus, as a union member, the grand lodge representative had the right under
§ IOl(a)(2) to oppose the proposed amendment.
29 Id. at 55 I. The court rejected the notion that the grand lodge representative could
oppose the constitutional amendment as an individual member, while supporting it in his
capacity as a union official. Id. at 551 n.25.
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the responsibilities of their employment. 30 Moreover, denying unions the right to fire employees for insubordination would undermine the cohesiveness of union leadership and thereby impair its
ability to bargain collectively with employers. 31
In Wambles v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 32 the
Fifth Circuit directly confronted the problem of reprisal discharges. The recently elected business manager of a local union
dismissed several assistant business managers and a bookkeeper
from their appointed positions because they had opposed his candidacy for office. 33 In a per curiam opinion, 34 the court held that
the discharged officials did not have a cause of action under sections 101(a)(l) and 10l(a)(2). 35
Noting that the LMRDA did not purport to establish a "civil
service-type structure," the Wambles court expressed concern
that ex tending the protections of sections 101 (a)( 1) and 101 (a)(2) to
appointed union officials would, in effect, freeze them into their
positions for life, except on dismissal for cause. The court emphasized that elected union officers, if forced to rely upon subordinates who opposed their election, would face intolerable obstacles
in implementing the policies and programs for which they were
elected. 36 To prevent union elections from being rendered meanau Id. at 551. The court suggested that an employee should resign if he can no longer
dicharge his duties in good conscience. Id. A strict analogy between corporate directors and
officers, and union officers and employees would dictate that union employees should be
subject to discharge for any reason by the officers or the membership, whereas union
officers should be subject to dismissal without cause only by the membership. See, e.g.,
Frank v. Anthony, 107 So.2d 136 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958); ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP.
ACT§§ 39, 51 (1953); DEL. CODE tit. VIII,§ 142(b) (1974); N.Y. Bus CoRP. LAW,§§ 706,
716 (McKinney 1963); 3 I. KANTROWITZ & s. SLUTSKY, WHITE ON NEW YORK
CORPORATIONS§ 706.03 (13th ed. 1968); Travers, Removal of the Corporate Director During
His Term of Office, 53 IOWA L. REv. 389 (1967).
31
455 F.2d at 551-52. Congress indicated that the LMRDA was not designed to impair the
rights of employees to organize and to bargain collectively with their employers. 29 U.S.C. §
401(a) (1970); S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1959), reprinted in I NLRB,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE AcT, at
401 (1959). In enacting the LMRDA, however, Congress also rejected the idea that only
autocratic unions can deal effectively with employers. See Beaird & Player, Free Speech
and the Landrum-Griffin Act, 25 ALA. L. REV. 577, 610 (1973); Cox, Internal Affairs of
Labor Unions Under the Labor Reform Act of /959, 58 MICH. L. REV. 819, 829-31 (1960).
Consequently, the courts have refused to limit the Title I rights of union members in order to
preserve the monolithic bargaining posture of labor organizations. See, e.g., Navarro v.
Gannon, 385 F. 2d 512,518 (2d Cir. 1967); Salzhandler v. Caputo, 316 F.2d 445,451 (2d Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 946 (1963). Nevertheless, since disagreement among the
leaders of a union may have a more severe impact on its bargaining position than rank and
file dissension, it can be argued that restricting the exercise of Title I rights by union officials
is proper.
32
488 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1974) (per curiam).
33
One of the assistant business managers was the opposing candidate for the office of
business manager. Id. at 489.
34
The court appended the opinion of the district court to its per curiam opinion.
35
488 F.2d at 889-90.
36
Id. at 890. The court asserted that the friction generated during election campaigns
would ·invariably impede the ability of elected officers to implement their programs. Id. at
889.
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ingless by the obstructionism of disgruntled appointed officials,
elected officers must have the power to discharge their subordinates "without cause or for any reason. " 37 The court compared
the right of elected union officers to discharge their subordinates
with the right of elected public representatives to dismiss appointed government officials. 38 Moreover, it suggested that the
courts would be plunged into a "thicket of subtleties and hypocrisies of charges'' if they had to determine whether there were bona
fide grounds to warrant discharging an appointed official for
cause. 39
B. Decisions Finding a Violation of the LMRDA

The leading decision protecting union officers and employees
from reprisal discharges is Grand Lodge, International Association
of Machinists v. King. 4 ° King and five other grand lodge representatives alleged that they were summarily discharged from their
appointed positions because they had actively supported the unsuccessful candidate for secretary-treasurer of the union. Concluding that Congress did not intend section 101(a)(5) to preclude the
summary removal or suspension of a member from union office, 41

37
Id. at 889. The court stated that the loyalties of appointed officials should belong to
their elected superiors, not to a "personal fiefdom beyond the reach of the membership."
Id. at 890.
38
/d. at 890. Traditionally, the courts held that non-civil service government employees
served at the pleasure of their superiors, see Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926);
Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U.S. 31 I (1903); Parsons v. United States, 167 U.S. 324
(I 897); Ex pa rte· Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230 (1839); Frug, Does the Constitution Prevent
the Discharge of Civil Service Employees?, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 942, 961 (1976), and that
patronage dismissals of these employees were lawful, see Alomar v. Dwyer, 447 F.2d 482
(2d Cir. 1971); American Fed'n of State, County, & Mun. Employees v. Shapp, 443 Pa. 527,
280 A.2d 375 (1971). In Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976), however, the Supreme Court
held that patronage dismissals of nonpolicymaking, nonconfidential government
employees violated the first and fourteenth amendments. The issues in Elrod are similar to
the issues in cases involving reprisal discharges of union officials.
39
488 F.2d at 890. The court suggested that appointed officials might deliberately oppose
any candidate for union office who threatened to dismiss them in order to cloud the issue of
cause with free speech questions. Id.
40 335 F.2d 340 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 920 (1964).
41
Id. at 341-42. During the congressional debates on Title I, several representatives
expressed concern that § IOl(a)(5) would impair unions' ability to remove officials
suspected of misconduct expeditiously. 105 CONG. REc. 17870 (1959), reprinted in II NLRB,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT, at
1414-15 (1959) (remarks of Sen. Morse); 105 CoNG. REC. 15537 (1959), reprinted in II NLRB,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT, at
1573 (1959) (remarks of Rep. Thompson). Responding to these objections the Conference
Committee inserted language in the Conference Report limiting the scope of §
IOl(a)(5). The Report explicitly stated that section IOl(a)(5) "applies only to suspension of
me_mbership in the union: it does not refer to suspension of a member's status as an officer in
•the union." H.R. REP. No. I 147, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1959), reprinted in II NLRB,
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the Ninth Circuit_ held that the allegations of these union officials
failed to state a claim under that section. 42 The court further held,
however, that the allegations stated a cause of action under sections lOl(a)(l), I0l(a)(2), and 609. 43
The court noted that these sections guarantee equal political
rights and freedom of speech and assembly to "every" union
member and that the statutory language does not except officer- or
employee-members from its coverage. 44 Concluding that the deletion of the word "officers" from section 101(a)(4) in conference
merely represented an elimination of surplusage and not a substantive change in the scope of Title I rights, 45 the court further deter-

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT, at
935 (1959). Explaining the Conference Report to the Senate, Senator Kennedy remarked
that § I0l(a)(5) did not "relate to suspension or removal from union office. Often this step
must be taken summarily to prevent dissipation or misappropriation of funds." 105 CONG.
REC. 17899 (1959), reprinted in II NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABORMANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT, at 1433 (1959). See generally 335 F.2d at
341-42.
42
335 F.2d at 342-43. The court reached this result by interpreting the phrase "otherwise
disciplined" in § 10l(a)(5) as not including removal from union office, rather than by
construing the word "member" in that section as excluding union officers. 335 F.2d at 343
n.11. While recognizing that Congress placed a limiting gloss on§ 10l(a)(5) primarily to
preserve union power to remove summarily union officials suspected of malfeasance, the
court concluded that Congress wholly excluded removal from union office from the scope of
this section in order to accomplish its purpose. 335 F.2d at 343. The courts have adopted this
position with virtual unanimity. See, e.g., Gabauer v. Woodcock, 520 F.2d 1084 (8th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1061 (1976); Schonfeld v. Penza, 477 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1973);
Martire v. Laborer's Local 1085, 410 F.2d 32 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 903 (1969);
Nelms v. United Ass'n of Plumbing & Pipefitting Indus., 405 F.2d 715 (5th Cir. 1%8);
Airline Stewards Local 550 v. Transport Workers Union, 334 F.2d 805 (7th Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 972 (1965); Grand Lodge, Int'! Ass'n of Machinists v. King, 335 F.2d 340
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 920 (1964). But see DeCampli v. Greeley, 293 F. Supp. 746,
753 (D.C.N.J. 1968); Burton v. Independent Packing House Workers Local 12, 199 F. Supp.
138, 140 (D. Kansas 1961). See also Wood v. Dennis, 489 F.2d 849, 858 n.4 (7th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960 (1974) (Stevens, J., concurring).
43
In Cooke v. Orange Belt Dist. Council of Painters 48, 529 F.2d 815 (9th Cir. 1976), the
Ninth Circuit subsequently held that the LMRDA protects union officials from retaliatory
reassignments as well as removal from office. Relying on King, the court found that an
elected business representative who alleged that he had been reassigned to service the
membership of a local 167 miles from his residence as a result of his support for a losing
candidate stated a valid cause of action under Title I and § 609. See also Cefalo v.
International Union of Dist. 50, UMW, 311 F. Supp. 946 (D.D.C. 1970).
44
335 F.2d at 343. The position that the protections of the "Bill of Rights" extend to all
union members, including those who are also union officials, is not necessarily inconsistent
with the view that union-officer and union-employee relationships are not protected by the
provisions of Title I. Although union members do not forfeit their Title I rights when they
become union officials, they do not acquire additional or expanded rights. Thus, reprisals
which interfere solely with their status as officers or employees do not encroach directly
upon the protections afforded by the "Bill of Rights."
45 335 F.2d at 343-44 & n.12. Noting that the Conference Committee did not comment on
the deletion of the word "officer" from § 101 (a)(4), the Ninth Circuit cited certain remarks
by Senator Mundt, 105 CONG. REC. 6478 (1959), reprinted in II NLRB, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT, at 1105 (1959),
as proof that the Senate assumed during the debates over Title I that officer-members were
included in§ 10l(a)(4). 335 F.2d at 343-44 & n.12. The remarks of Senator Mundt, however,
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mined that the legislative history did not reveal a congressional
intent to deny Title I rights to officer- or employee-members. 46
The King court also found that section 609 prohibited the union
from dismissing the grand lodge representatives for exercising their
rights under Title I. While interpreting the phrase "otherwise, discipline" in section 10 I (a)(5) as not including removal from union
office, the court asserted that the same words in section 609 encompassed ·such removals. 47 The court observed that Congress
imposed a limiting gloss on the words "otherwise discipline" in
section I01 (a)(5) in order to preserve union power to summarily
remove wrongdoing union officials. 48 Since section 609 is a general
enforcement provision, not a guarantee of procedural due process
rights like section I0l(a)(5), imposing a similar restriction on section 609 would not further this legislative purpose. Finding that the
legislative history did not reflect a congressional intent to preserve
the right of unions to discipline their officials for exercising Title I
rights, the court concluded that excluding removal from office as
outside of the scope of section 609 would expose union officials to
an effective weapon of reprisal without serving any apparent legislative purpose. 49
The King court emphasized that exposing officer- and
employee-members to reprisal discharges would leave unprotected
those members whose uninhibited exercise of freedom of speech
and assembly is most important to the promotion of union democracy. 50 Responding to the argument that elected union officers
must have the power to discharge subordinate officials who express support for their opponents and to replace them with persons
who are in accord with their views and will assist in carrying out
the responsibilities of their positions, the court contended that this
was tantamount to arguing that appointed officials must abstain
from intra-union politics. Although recognizing that the "reason-

concerned a union officer who was expelled from membership in his union for initiating a
suit. Moreover, his remarks concerned the Senate version of§ I0l(a)(4) which contained the
words "or officer."
46
335 F.2d at 343-44.
47
Id. at 344-45. The court recognized that "it is natural to suppose that within a single
statute the same words will be used with the same meaning." Nonetheless. it noted that
identical words are commonly used with different meanings in the same statute. Id. at 344.
48
See notes 41 and 42 and accompanying text supra.
49
335 F.2d at 345. Noting that Congress expressly preserved the right of the membership
to remove wrongdoing union officials, 29 U .S.C. § 481(h) (1970). the court distinguished this
right from the power of controlling union officers to discharge subordinate officials for
·exercising their Title I rights. Id. at 345-46 & n.2 I.
50
•
Id. at 345. The court also noted that union officials are best equipped to keep union
government vigorously_democratic. Id. at 344. See notes 96 and 97 and accompanying text
infra.
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able rules and regulations" provisions of sections I0l(c:1)(1) and
I0l(a)(2) might permit unions to require that appointed officials
remain politically neutral in order to promote efficient administration, the King court noted tht the defendant union had not established such a rule. 51
In Wood v. Dennis, 52 the president of a union division alleged
that he was removed from his elected office for expressing his
views concerning the rights of members of the union division, and
for announcing his intention to become a candidate for the presidency of the entire union. 53 A divided Seventh Circuit held that the
allegations of the deposed officer stated a cause of action under
sections I0l(a)(2) and 609. 54 The court endorsed the Ninth Circuit's analysis of the relevant legislative history and its conclusion
that the words "otherwise discipline" should be interpreted differently in section 609 and 101(a)(5). Moreover, declaring that the
legislative history did not suggest that union members forfeit their
rights under Title I upon becoming union officials, the Seventh
Circuit observed that reprisal discharges exerted a chilling effect
on the exercise of membership rights and thereby undermined
union democracy. Even though the president of the subsidiary
union was not precluded from speaking out as a member, in the
court's view, his freedom of speech had been impaired because

51
Id. at 346. The court analogized such rules to the Hatch Act, which forbids federal
employees to engage in partisan politics. Id. Since the active participation of officer- and
employee-members in union politics is needed in order to promote effective union democracy, however, it can be argued that requiring political neutrality as a condition of union
employment violates the spirit of the LMRDA. See Note, supra note 5, at 606.
52 489 F.2d 849 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. %0 (1974).
53 Id. at 851-52. Lowry, the president of the Transportation-Communication Employees
Union (TCEU) negotiated a merger of that union with the Brotherhood of Railway, Airline
and Steamship Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express and Station Employees (BRAC). The
provisions of the merger agreement provided that the president of the TransportationCommunication Division of BRAC (T-C Division) would be elected independently by the
members of the Division and that the Division would continue to handle its own affairs.
Lowry later disagreed with Dennis, the president of BRAC, concerning the operation of the
merger agreement. After Lowry informed Dennis that he intended to become a candidate for
the presidency of BRAC in the next election, Dennis dismissed Lowry from his elected
position as president of the T-C Division. Id.
54
Id. at 853. The court also held that several members of the subsidiary union who alleged
that their voting rights were nullified by the removal of Lowry from office, did not have a
cause of action under section IOl(a)(I). The court rejected the view that the voting rights
provisions of section IOl(a)(I) are violated whenever an elected union officer is removed
from his position. The court reasoned that the summary removal of union officials, which is
permitted under section IOl(a)(5), is inconsistent with the notion that union members have
an absolute right to their elected officials. Furthermore, the court noted that there was no
indication from the record that the removal of Lowry from office was designed to intimidate
the membership. Id. at 857. See generally Schonfeld v. Penza, 447 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1973);
notes 76-82 and accompanying text infra.
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dismissal from office had reduced the effectiveness of his speech. 55
The court distinguished Sheridan 56 on the ground that it involved
the removal of a business agent from office by democratic vote of
the union membership, whereas in Wood the deposed official was
simply discharged by his nominal superior. 57 The Wood court also
distinguished Sewell, 58 maintaining that only appointed officials,
not elected officials, could be guilty of insubordination. 59
Judge Stevens concurred in the result, 60 but refused to adopt the
statutory interpretation enunciated in King. 61 Focusing on the
parallel between the language of sections 609 and 101(a)(5), Judge
Stevens stated that if Congress had intended section 609 to have a
broader scope than section 101(a)(5), it would have expressed this
intent more clearly. 62 Furthermore, while doubting that Congress
intended to address the problem of patronage discharges when it
enacted the LMRDA, Judge Stevens suggested that if Congress
had considered the issue, it would have allowed appointed,
policymaking officials to be removed by their superiors. 63 Similarly, the dissenting judges argued that the legislative history of
section 609 clearly revealed that Congress intended this section to
be merely a general enforcement provision, not a guarantee of
additional, substantive rights. 64

55

489 F.2d at 853-55.
See notes 14-23 and accompanying text supra.
489 F.2d at 854. This distinction is explored in Part III A infra. The court also noted that
Judge Kalodner's opinion in Sheridan was not supported by the other members of the panel,
and that although Martire v. Laborers' Local 1058. 410 F.2d 32 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 903 (I 969). appeared to endorse his opinion, see note 16 supra. its holding actually
was limited to section IOI (a)(5). Id.
58
See notes 24-31 and accompanying text supra.
59
489 F.2d at 855-56. The court also indicated that it Jacked the substantial. undisputed
factual information which had enabled the Fifth Circuit to draw the fine distinction between
free speech and insubordination in Sewell.
60
Id. at 857-58. Judge Stevens agreed with the majority that the district court's dismissal
of the complaint should be reversed and that the case should be remanded for further
proceedings. Noting that the district court had refused to consider evidence tendered by the
plaintiffs at a preliminary hearing, Judge Stevens indicated that additional acts of reprisal
might constitute unlawful discipline. He also suggested that since the deposed official was
elected rather than appointed, the controversy might come within the rationale of Schonfeld
v. Penza, 447 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1973). See notes 76-82 and accompanying text infra.
61
See notes 40-51 and accompanying text supra.
62
489 F.2d at 857-58. In a footnote, however, Judge Stevens observed that the risk of
financial misconduct, which led Congress to impose a limiting gloss on § IOJ(a)(5).
could be avoided by excluding only the temporary suspension of union officials, not their
permanent removal from the coverage of this section. Id. at 858 n.4.
63 489 F.2d at 858. In a footnote, Judge Stevens also stated, "Since I do not believe
Congress intended to address the patronage issue in this statute, I also doubt the validity of
the implied exception permitting disciplinary discharges for insubordination." Id. at 858 n.3.
•• 489 F.2d at 858-59. As the legislative history reveals, Congress did not discuss the
meaning of the words "otherwise discipline" or whether § 609 applied to the removal
of members from union office. Most of the debate over § 609 centered on the question
56

57
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In Gabouer 1•. Woodcock, 6 " the chairman of a shop committee
and a district committeeman alleged that they were summarily
removed from their elected positions and deprived of their right to
seek elective office because they had expressed their opposition to
a strike and the subsequent imposition of a trusteeship on their.
local. 66 Relying on Wood and King and their interpretation of the
relevant legislative history, the Eighth Circuit held that section 609
protected union officials from being discharged for exercising
rights protected under section IO I (a)(2) and that the allegations of
the deposed officials therefore stated a cause of action under those
sections. 67 The court also suggested that their allegations might
state a cause of action under section IO I (a)(5) on the ground that
the deprivation of the right to seek elective union office affected
their status as union members. 68 Upon reviewing the record, however, the Gabouer court concluded that there was insufficient
evidence to warrant sending either of these claims to a jury. 69
The Second Circuit also has apparently accepted the view that
of whether it should be enforced by the Secretary of Labor or through private suits by
individual members. 105 CONG. REC. 6478 (1959), reprinted in ·II NLRB. LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT, at 1104-05
(1959) (remarks of Sen. McClellan); 105 CONG. REC. 15530 (1959), reprinted in II NLRB.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT, at
1567 (1959) (remarks of Rep. Shelly); 105 CONG. REC. 15830 (1959), reprinted in II NLRB.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT, at
1662 (1959) (remarks of Rep. Cramer); 105 CONG. REC. 15853 ( 1959), reprinted in II NLRB.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT, at
1685 (1959) (remarks of Rep. Dowdy). The fact that Congress decided to enforce § 609
through § 102 maY. indicate that it did not intend § 609 to have a broader scope than
the provisions of Title I.
65
520 F.2d 1084 (8th Cir. 1975). cert. denied. 423 U.S. 1061 (1976).
66 The allegations of the district committeeman were considered in a companion case.
Huskey v. UAW. 520 F.2d 1096 (8th Cir. 1975). cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1061 (1976). Gabauer
and Huskey wrote a letter to the vice-president of the union on April I. 1969. informing him
of their opposition to a strike by their local. After a trusteeship was imposed on their local in
June. 1970. they distributed handbills to the membership criticizing the trusteeship. Gabauer
and Huskey were summarily removed from office in late June. 1970. After a hearing on
August 27th. they were convicted of financial improprieties and barred from seeking elective
office. Id. at 1087-89.
67 520 F.2d at 1091.
68
520 F.2d at 1093-94. Following the weight of authority. the court held that Gabauer and
Huskey did not have a cause of action under § IOl(a)(5) by virtue of their summary
removal from union office. The court noted, however. that the Second and Third Circuits
had held that the summary deprivation of the right to seek elective union office created a
cause of action under § IOl(a)(5). See note 82 and accompanying text infra. Finding
that there was insufficient evidence to support the allegations of Gabauer and Huskey that
the hearing which resulted in the suspension of their eligibility for union office violated the
due process provisions of § IOl(a)(5), the court declined to decide this question. 5:lU
F.2d at 1093-94.
69
Id. at 1092-94. Characterizing the allegations of Gabauer and Huskey as .. pure speculation," the court found substantial evidence to support the union's contention that these
officials were disciplined for refusing to comply with lawful directives from their superiors
and for committing financial improprieties. The court also found that the plaintiffs were
afforded due process within the meaning of § IOl(a)(5) at the hearing which resulted in
the suspension of their candidacy rights. Id.
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reprisal discharges violate the LMRDA. In Salzhandler v.
Caputo, 70 the financial secretary of a local union was removed
from his elected office and excluded from participation in union
affairs for five years 71 after a trial board convicted him of libeling
Caputo, the local's president. 72 Finding that section IO l(a)(2) protected even libelous statements, 73 the court held that the union
could not lawfully subject Salzhandler to disciplinary action for
expressing his opinions about the management of the union. Without discussing whether removal from union office constituted discipline within the meaning of section 609,7 4 the court enjoined the
union from carrying out the sanctions imposed by the trial board. 75
In Schonfeld v. Penza, 76 the Second Circuit directly addressed
the question whether the removal of a union official from office
could violate the LMRDA. Schonfeld was removed from his
elected position as secretary-treasurer of a district council and
barred from seeking elective office 77 after a trial board found him
guilty of mishandling a jurisdictional dispute with another union. 78
Alleging that he was denied a fair hearing and that the charges had
been brought against him solely for the purpose of suppressing
opposition and dissent within the union, Schonfeld and several
other members of the district council sought a preliminary injunction restraining his removal from office and preventing the holding
10

316 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 946 (1963).
Salzhandler was barred from attending, speaking, and voting at union meetings, and
from being a candidate for union office. Id. at 448.
72
Salzhandler had distributed leaflets accusing the local's president oflarceny. Id. at 447.
73 The court stated that the LMRDA was designed to protect the rights of union members
to discuss freely and to criticize the management of their union. The court also doubted the
ability of union tribunals to distinguish between criticism and defamation. Id. at 448-50.
74 316 F.2d at 451. The court simply assumed that Salzhandler's removal from office was a
fonn of discipline:
Freedom of expression would be stifled if those in power could claim that any
charges against them were libelous and then proceed to discipline those responsible
on a finding that the charges were false. That is precisely what Webman and the
Trial Board did here when they punished Salzhandler with a five-year ban of
silence and stripped him of his office.
Id. at 451 (emphasis supplied).
75 The court also indicated that Salzhandler was entitled to damages. Id. In Sands v.
Abelli, 290 F. Supp. 677 (S.D.N. Y. 1968), a district court awarded Salzhandler compensatory damages for the loss of salary caused by his removal from office, damages for mental
suffering and humiliation, exemplary damages, and attorney fees. Since his tenn of office
had expired when the decision was rendered, the district court did not reinstate him to
office. Furthermore, the district court declined to award him damages for the loss of his
opportunity to seek reelection, regarding his prospects for electoral success as too speculative.
76 477 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1973).
77
The district council's trial board originally barred Schonfeld from seeking office for five
years, but the executive board of the international union modified this part of his penalty,
making him eligible to run in the next regular election, which was only three months away.
Id. at 901.
7
" The trial board found that Schonfeld had bypassed the district council's Agreement
Committee in handling the jurisdictional dispute and that he had misrepresented the matter
to the council's delegates. Id. at 901 n.1.
71
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of an interim election. 7!i The court granted the preliminary injunction, finding that Schonfeld and the other members had stated
claims under the LMRDA. Although the court held that the members had no cause of action under section IOl(a)(l), 80 it also held
that in light of the peculiar history of factionalism in the district
council, their allegations stated a cause of action under section
IOI(a)(2). The Schonfeld court stressed that its decision was limited to situations where the reprisals were part of "a purposeful
and deliberate attempt by union officials to suppress dissent within
the union. " 81 For similar reasons, the court held that Schonfeld
had stated a claim under section IOl(a)(2). Moreover, acknowledging that the restrictions on his eligibility for union office affected
his status as a member, the court concluded that Schonfeld could
challenge the fairness of his disciplinary proceeding under section
IOl(a)(5). 82

II. REPRISAL DISCHARGES AND UNION DEMOCRACY

Since the statutory language and legislative history of the
LMRDA are ambiguous, the courts must examine the fundamental

purposes of the legislation to determine whether union officials can
be discharged for exercising rights protected under Title 1. 83 Con79 Schonfeld alleged that the charges were brough-t against him in retaliation for his efforts
to make the district council more democratic. In a separate action. the members further
alleged that the reprisals against Schonfeld constituted a form of intimidation of the membership. Id. at 901-03.
80
Id. at 902-03. The court concluded that this portion of the members' complaint was
governed by Calhoon v. Harvey. 379 U.S. 134 (1964). which held that unreasonable limitations on eligibility for union office violate the provisions of Title IV. not § I0l(a)(I).
Unlike Title I rights. the provisions of Title IV may be enforced only by the Secretary of
Labor. 29 U.S.C. § 482 (1970).
81
477 F.2d at 903-04.
82
Id. at 904. The courts have generally held that the union-member relationship is
affected, and consequently that the protections of§ IOl(a)(5) apply, when a member is
declared ineligible to run for union office. See Schonfeld v. Penza, 477 F.2d 899 (2d Cir.
1973); Martire v. Laborers' Local 1058, 410 F.2d 32 (3d Cir. 1969),cert. denied, 396 U.S. 903
(1969); Stillwell v. Smith. 94 L.R.R.M. 2421 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Sipe v. Local 191, United
Bhd. of Carpenters. 393 F. Supp. 865 (M.D. Pa. 1975); Hartner v. Baltimore Regional Joint
Bd .. Amalgamated Clothing Workers. 339 F. Supp. 1257 (D. Md. 1972). See generally
Gabauer v. Woodcock. 520 F.2d 1084 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1061 (1976). But
see Verbiscus v. Industrial Union of Marine & Shipbuilding Workers Local 49, 238 F. Supp.
848(E.D. Mich. 1964); Mamula v. Local 1211, United Steelworkers, 205 F. Supp. 915 (W.D.
Pa. 1962); Hamilton v. Guinan. 199 F. Supp. 562 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). Also. the courts have
generally held that the protections of § I0l(a)(5) apply when a union official is tined if
the penalty for nonpayment of the fine is e·xpulsion from the union. See Martire v. Laborers'
Local 1058, 410 F.2d 32 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 903 (1969); Sipe v. Local 191.
United Bhd. of Carpenters. 393 F. Supp. 865 (M.D. Pa. 1975). But see Verbiscus v.
Industrial Union of Marine & Shipbuilding Workers Local 49, 238 F. Supp. 848 (E.D. Mich.
1964).
83
Noting that much of the LM RDA was written on the floor of the House and Senate and
that the Act contains many calculated ambiguities or political compromises. Professor
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gress enacted the LMRDA in order to curb corruption and to
promote democracy in labor organizations. 84 To encotrrage the
development of internal union democracy, the LMRDA regulates
union elections 85 and trusteeships 86 and guarantees union members
certain fundamental rights. 87 These provisions reflect the view that
union democracy can flourish only where the members control the
decisions which affect them and where the rights of individuals and
minorities are protected. 88 The LMRDA also reflects the belief that
government interference in internal union affairs should be
minimized to avoid undermining union self-govemment. 89
A. Reprisal Discharges as a Threat
to Union Democracy
Reprisal discharges may undermine internal union democracy by
impairing or chilling the exercise of rights protected under Title I .90
Without the resources and prestige of union office, the effectiveness with which deposed union officials exercise Title I rights,
especially the right to free speech, may be impaired. 91 Further-

Archibald Cox, one of the architects of the legislation, admonished courts that they "would
be well advised to seek out the underlying rationale without placing great emphasis upon
close construction of the words." Cox, supra note 31, at 852.
84
29 U.S.C. § 401(b) (1970).
85
See Title IV of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 481-483 (1970).
86
See Title III of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 461-466 (1970).
87
See Title I of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-105 (1970). See also note 2 supra.
88
See Cox, supra note 31, at 829. See also Summers, The Public Interest in Union
Democracy, 53 Nw. U.L. REV. 610, 613 (1958).
89
See Hodgson v. Local 6799, United Steelworkers, 403 U.S. 333 (1971); Wirtz v. Local
153, Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 389 U.S. 463 (1968); Cox, supra note 31. at 831; Hickey,
The Bill of Rights of Union Members, 48 GEO. L.J. 226, 228-29 (1959).-The introduction to
the Senate Report states, "In providing remedies for existing evils the Senate should be
careful neither to undermine self-government nor to weaken unions in their role as the
bargaining representatives or'employees." S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1959),
reprinted in I NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING
AND DISCLOSURE AcT, at 401 (1959). Congress rejected proposals by Sen. McClellan which
would have established a registration system for unions and prescribed the terms of union
constitutions and bylaws. See Cox, supra note 31, at 831. The minimum democratic
safeguards contained in the LMRDA reflect the belief that if union members are given the
proper tools, they will "clean house themselves." 105 CONG. REC. 6476 (1959), reprinted in
II NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT, at 1102-03 (1959) (remarks of Sen. McClellan).
90
See Wood v. Dennis, 489 F.2d 849, 855 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960
(1974); Retail Clerks Local 648 v. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, 299 T. Supp. 1012, 1021 (D.D.C.
1961}); DeCampli v. Greeley, 293 F. Supp. 746, 752 (D.N.J. 1968).
91 See Wood v. Dennis, 489 F.2d 849, 855 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960
(1974); note 55 and accompanying text supra. In this case the court stated:
suppression of freedom of speech is not limited to noninterference with vocalization. Rights of communication cannot be so restricted as to be meaningless ...
Lowry was possessed of an effective voice as an officer. It cannot be said that his
freedom of speech as a member is unimpaired when that which made his speech
effective is removed for improper disciplinary reasons.
So long as their status as union members is not affected, however, deposed officials still
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more, where removal from office entails significant hardships, 92
deposed union officials may be discouraged from continuing to
exercise their rights. Most importantly, reprisal discharges and
threats of such discharges may exert a chilling effect on the exercise of protected rights because they present union officials with a
"Hobson's choice," forcing them to choose between their Title I
rights and their jobs. 93 When confronted with such a situation,
most union officials, in practice, will abstain from exercising their
rights in order to keep their positions. 94 In addition to the chilling
effect on individual officials who are threatened with dismissal,
there is a general chilling effect on the exercise of protected rights
by other union officials and ordinary union members. 95
Any impairment or chilling of the exercise of Title I rights by
union officers or employees is harmful to union democracy. Although union officials comprise only a small segment of the total
membership, they play a crucial role in the promotion of union
democracy. Besides being more knowledgeable about union affairs
than most other members, union officers and employees usually
have an almost complete monopoly over the formal means of

enjoy the same Title I rights as other members. Moreover, it is questionable whether the
LMRDA guarantees union officials the right to enhanced effectiveness in the exercise of
Title I rights. Indeed, § 401 (c) and (g) is designed to prevent union officials from
utilizing the advantages of incumbency during election campaigns. 29 U .S.C. §§ 481 (c) and
(g) (1970). Also, union officials commit a fiduciary violation if they use the resources and
prestige of union office to support activities which do not benefit the union, such as personal
reelection campaigns. 29 U .S.C. § 501 (1970).
92
In addition to losing the salary and the prestige of union office, deposed union officials
may suffer significant psychological trauma, particularly if they are ostracized by their
fellow members. See generally Sands v. Abelli, 290 F. Supp. 677 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Lipset,
The Political Process in Trade Unions, A Theoretical Statement, in LABOR AND TRADE
UNIONISM: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY READER 216, 221-25 (W. Galenson & s. Lipset eds.
1960).
93
See Retail Clerks Local 648 v. Retail Clerks Int'I Ass'n, 299 F. Supp. 1012, 1020-21
(D.D.C. 1969); DeCampli v. Greeley, 293 F. Supp. 746, 752 (D.N.J. 1968).
94
See generally Lipset, supra note 92. By making the exercise of Title I rights costly,
reprisal discharges and threats of such discharges, in effect, compel union officials to give up
their membership rights. Cf. Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 5 I I (1967); Garrity v. New Jersey,
385 U.S. 493 (1967); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S.
513 (1958). (government compels citizens to give .up first ·and fifth amendment rights by
making the exercise of these constitutional rights too costly).
95
The general chilling effect is most apparent when the reprisals are part of a deliberate
campaign by the incumbent administration to silence opposition. See Schonfeld v. Penza,
477 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1973). Even where the disciplinary action is merely an isolated event,
however, other officers and members are reminded of their vulnerability and are pressured
into conforming with the prevailing norms of conduct. Nevertheless, it is doubtful that the
courts will entertain a suit based on this general chilling effect, since deposed union officials
do not have standing to litigate the Title I rights of other members. See Grove v. Glass Bottle
Blowers Ass'n, 329 F. Supp. 337, 338 (W.D.J>-a. 1971). See generally Mamula v. United
Steelworkers, 304 F.2d 108, 113 (3d Cir. 1962). Moreover, union members can only protest
the dismissal of their officers by filing a complaint with the Secretary of Labor pursuant to
Title IV, not by bringing suit under the provisions of Title I. See Wood v. Dennis, 489 F.2d
849, 857 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960 (1974). But see Schonfeld v. Penza, 477
F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1973).
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communication within their unions and the opportunities for learning political and organizational skills. 96 Furthermore, since rank
and file members often look to union officials for guidance because
of the responsibility and the prestige of their positions, union
officials have a greater responsibility to assert their Title I rights
vigorously. 97
B. Reprisal Discharges as an Integral
Part of Union Democracy
Despite their potentially harmful impact on the exercise of Title I
rights, reprisal discharges of union officials may actually contribute
to union democracy. Elected union officers must be able to discharge subordinate officials without cause in order to implement
programs and policies which have been mandated by the union
membership. 98 Even in the absence of direct insubordination, the
friction resulting when elected officers and their subordinates espouse opposing positions may impede the efficient implementation
of the leadership's programs. 99 Thus, unless elected officers are
permitted to discharge their subordinates, entrenched union
bureaucracies which are unresponsive to the membership may
develop, and union elections will be rendered less meaningful. 100
Furthermore, the ability of elected union officers to dispense
appointive positions as a form of patronage helps promote vigorous
union democracy. Patronage hiring practices may stimulate interest and participation by the membership in internal union politics,
particularly on the local level. 101 Also, they may assist insurgent
96
See Lipset, supra note 92, at 217-20. See generally Grand Lodge, Int'l Ass'n of
Machinists v. King, 335 F.2d 340, 344-45 (9th Cir. 1%4), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 920 (1964);
Retail Clerks Local 648 v. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, 299 F. Supp. 1012, 1021 (D.D.C.
1969).
97
See DeCampli v. Greeley, 293 F. Supp. 746, 752 (D.N.J. 1968).
98
See Wambles v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 488 F.2d 888, 889-90 (5th Cir. 1974)
(per curiam). Despite imperfections in the electoral processes of some unions, see, e.f(.,
Wirtz v. Hotel, Motel & Club Employees Union, 391 U.S. 492 (1%8), in view of the
democratic safeguards established by the LMRDA, courts are justified in presuming that
elected officers receive a mandate from the membership to carry out certain programs.
99
Although subordinate officials who opposed the union leadership may become reconciled to the views of their superiors and continue to perform their duties properly, they may
lack the dedication and enthusiasm of persons who are completely loyal to the elected
officials. See generally Wambles v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 488 F.2d 888, 889-90
(5th Cir. 1974) (per curiam).
100
Id. Indeed, subordinate officials might attempt to insulate themselves from accountability to the leadership by characterizing their actions as political opposition. Id. at 890. It
has been argued that subordinate officials owe their loyalty to the union as an institution,
and indirectly to the membership, rather than to individual leaders. See Note, supra note 5,
at 594-96. This argument merely begs the question, however, since it does not determine
who decides what the interests of the members are.
101
See Lipset, supra note 92, at 225. Cf. Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 383-85 (1976)
(Powell, J., dissenting) (patronage hiring practices stimulate interest and participation by
citizens in public politics).
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movements by enabling them to establish the political base needed
to successfully challenge incumbent union administrations . 102
Finally, judicially imposed limitations on the power of elected
union officers to discharge their subordinates involve. increased
government interference in internal union affairs, thereby weakening union self-government. 103 By preventing the dismissal of certain union officials, the courts will directly affect the internal operations of unions. Moreover, whatever restrictions are imposed on
reprisal discharges, the courts will have to closely scrutinize internal union affairs in order to implement these limitations. 104 Most
importantly, where union constitutions and bylaws permit reprisal
discharges, the courts will, in effect, be substituting their judgment
about such discharges for the views of union members. 105

Ill. A SUGGESTED APPROACH

A. The Cause of Action

In deciding whether reprisal discharges violate the LMRDA, the
courts have considered several factors which are not particularly
helpful in resolving the issue. There is little justification for inquiring whether the authority to discharge the union official was
explicitly granted or merely implied in the union constitution. 106
102
Successful insurgent movements often develop from a particular region, department,
or council in the union where the dissident group controls a certain amount of patronage and
is securely entrenched. See generally J. BARBASH, supra note 5, at 67, 96-99. For example,
the insurgent movement led by Walter Reuther in the UAW succeeded, in part, because it
developed from the powerful General Motors Department of the union. See E. CORMIER &
W. EATON, REUTHER (1970).
103
See note 89 and accompanying text supra.
10
• At a minimum, the courts will have to ascertain the motivations behind the discharges.
Furthennore, if they attempt to distinguish between insubordination and political opposition, official and personal activities, or policymaking and nonpolicymaking officials, the
courts also will have to make detenninations concerning the scope of union officials' duties
and the institutional interests of unions.
105
Judicial limitations on reprisal discharges will most conflict with the views of union
members where the dismissals result from a vote by the entire union membership. See, e.g.,
Sheridan v. United Bhd. of Carpenters Local 626, 306 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1962).
10
• In analyzing reprisal discharges, several courts have noted that authority for the
discharges was expressly granted in the union constitution. See Wambles v. International
Bhd. of Teamsters, 488 F.2d 888, 889 (5th Cir.. 1974) (per curiam); DeCampli v. Greeley, 293
F. Supp. 746, 748-49 (D.N.J. 1968). Section IOl(b) of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. § 41 I(b)
(1970), provides, however, that provisions of union constitutions which are inconsistent
with the provisions of Title I are invalid. Therefore, if reprisal discharges violate Title I, the
presence of provisions in union constitutions authorizing such dismissals should be immaterial. Moreover, since unions may discipline their members for offenses not proscribed by
written rules, International Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Hardeman, 401 U.S. 233 (1971), it
would be anomalous to require that they have specific constitutional provisions in order to
remove union officials from office. Finally, this distinction has little practical significance,
since unions can amend their constitutions to provide elected officers with the authority to
discharge subordinate officials.
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Similarly, examining whether the deposed official was discharged
for actions committed in an official or personal capacity, 107 or
whether the deposed official was discharged for intra-union political activities or for insubordination, 108 is not very meaningful. To
advance the fundamental purposes of the LMRDA, the courts
should instead consider two crucial factors: the position occupied
by the deposed official and the process by which the official was
removed.
Reprisal discharges of elected officers are clearly inconsistent
with union democracy. In addition to thwarting the electoral process, the dismissal of elected officers also chills the exercise of
Title I rights by members who, due to their ability to marshal
political support, play an especially important role in the promotion of vigorous union democracy. 109 Since all elected officers
receive a mandate from the membership, their dismissals cannot be
rationalized as necessary to facilitate the implementation of programs and policies which have been mandated by the membership.110 Moreover, reprisal discharges of elected officers do not
provide a mechanism for distributing patronage, 111 since the positions must ultimately be filled by election. While judicial limitations on reprisal discharges of elected officers will increase government interference in internal union affairs, 112 this consideration
is not sufficien~ to justify such dismissals.
Reprisal discharges of appointed officials, on the other hand, are
more compatible with union democracy than reprisal discharges of
elected officers. Although the dismissal of appointed officials may
produce a chilling effect on their exercise of Title I rights, this
poses less of a threat to union democracy than a chilling effect on

• 01 See Sheridan v. United Bhd. of Carpenters Local 626. 306 F.2d 152, 165 (3d Cir. 1962)
(McLaughlin, J., dissenting). This distinction is artificial because the prestige of union office
or employment attaches to all activities of union officials. 306 F.2d at 157-58.
10 • See Sewell v. Grand Lodge, Infl Ass'n of Machinists, 445 F.2d 545, 550-52 (5th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1024 (1972). Since union officials are often called upon to
advocate the programs and policies that the leadership seeks to implement, it is not always
possible to distinguish clearly between insubordination and political opposition. See Note,
supra note 5, at 570-71, 593-97. It might be possible to distinguish between officials who are
discharged for exercising rights protected under§ lOl(a)(2) rather than rights protected by §
l0l(a)(4) on the ground that the former are more important to the realization of a vigorous
democracy. Since most actions involve § l0l(a)(2), however, this distiction would be of
limited utility.
109 Cf. Retail Clerks Local 648 v. Retail Clerks Int'I Ass'n, 299 F. Supp. 1012, 1021
(D.D.C. 1969) (members holding responsible offices in labor organizations can best marshal
the political support needed to challenge incumbent administrations). See !I/so notes 96 and
97 and accompanying text supra.
110 See notes 98-100 and accompanying text supra. There is less danger that elected
officers will form an entrenched bureaucracy, since they must always stand for reelection.
111
See notes IOI and 102 and accompanying text supra.
112
See notes 103-105 and accompanying text supra.
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the exercise of pr9tected rights by elected officers. 113 Furthermore, reprisal discharges of appointed officials may be necessary
to prevent the development of entrenched union bureaucracies
which would obstruct the implementation of policies and programs
mandated by the membership. 114 Reprisal discharges of appointed
officials may also be justified on the ground that they are an
integral part of the patronage system in unions. 115 Finally, any
judicial limitations on the dismissal of appointed officials will conflict with the ideal of union self-government. 116
Regardless of the position occupied by the deposed official,
reprisal discharges which result from a vote by the entire membership are consistent with union democracy. Where a single officer
orders the dismissal, there is always a potential danger that the
discharge is motivated by personal or political animosity rather
than concern for the welfare of the union .117 This potential danger
also exists where the dismissal is ordered by a trial board. Although trial boards may follow quasi-judicial procedures which
give their decisions an aura of. legitimacy,. they may be controlled

113
Appointed officials play a more important role in promoting union democracy than do
ordinary members. See notes 96 and 97 and accompanying text supra. Nevertheless,
appointed officials usually do not command the same respect among union members as
elected officers and, therefore, have a lesser obligation to assert their rights vigorously. See
notes 97 and 109 and accompanying text supra.
11
• See notes 99 and 100 and accompanying text supra. Appointed officials will often be in
a position to obstruct the implementation of policies and programs ordered by the union
leadership. Moreover, since appointed officials never have to stand for election, they need
not be responsive to the interests of the membership.
115
See notes 7, 101, and 102 and accompanying text supra.
116
See notes I03-105 and accompanying text supra. Analogizing to the Supreme Court's
decision in Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347 (1976), see note 38 supra, it can be argued that
reprisal discharges for nonconfidential, nonpolicymaking union employees should be prohibited by the LMRDA. The Burns decision was based in part on the premise that nonconfidential, nonpolicymaking government employees would seldom be in a position tci
thwart the goals of their superiors, 427 U.S. at 367. In contrast, many nonconfidential,
nonpolicymaking union employees, such as staff representatives, play crucial roles in
implementing union policies and will often be in positions to obstruct the programs of
elected officers whom they oppose. See Joseph, The Role of the Field Staff Representative,
12 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 353,355,364 (1959). See generally Wambles v. International
Bhd. of Teamsters, 488 F.2d 888, 889-90 (5th Cir. 1974) (per curiam).
A stronger argument can be made that reprisal discharges of ministerial union employees
should violate the LMRDA. Employees who perform ministerial tasks, such as clerical or
maintenance personnel, will rarely be able to interfere with the implementation of policies
mandated by the membership. To apply this distinction, however, the courts would have to
consider the precise status of the deposed officials in every case. Since few ministerial
employees are members of the unions for whom they work, see Note, supra note 5, at 569
n.28, this judicial intrusion into internal union affairs would undermine union democracy
more than it would promote it.
117
See Wambles v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 488 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1974) (per
curiam); Wood v. Dennis, 489 F.2d 849 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960 (1974);
Retail Clerks Local 648 v. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, 299 F. Supp. 1012 (D.D.C. 1969). This
danger is especially great where the deposed official has previously criticized the officer who
orders his dismissal. See Yablonski v. UMW, 80 L.R.R.M. 3435 (D.D.C. 1972); DeCampli
v. Greeley, 293 F. Supp. 746 (D.N.J. 1968).
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by a single, dominant union officer. 118 Where the decision to remove a union official is made by a vote of the entire membership,
however, even if the membership acts from improper motives, the
discharge reflects a democratic consensus.11 9
The conflicting decisions of the Courts of Appeal can generally
be reconciled if they are analyzed in terms of these two factors.
With the exception of King, all of the decisions finding that reprisal
discharges violate the LMRDA have involved the dismissal of
elected union officers. 120 On the other hand, the decisions finding
that reprisal discharges are not prohibited by the LMRDA have
involved either the dismissal of appointed officials 121 or the removal of an elected officer by a vote of the entire membership. 122
B. Procedure

If the protections of Title I and section 609 extend to some union
officials, the courts must decide what standard should be used in
determining whether discharges are actually retaliatory and how
the burden of proof1 23 should be allocated. 124 There are several
standards which could be used in determining whether dismissals
of union officials constitute unlawful reprisals. One approach
would find that discharges of union officials violate the LMRDA
whenever they are motivated "in any substantial degree" by the
exercise of Title I rights. 125 Under this test, even if there were
118
See Schonfeld v. Penza, 477 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1973); Parks v. International Bhd. of
Elec. Workers, 314 F.2d 886 (4th Cir. 1963); Needham v. Isbister, 84 L.R.R.M. 2105
(D.Mass. 1973).
119
See Sheridan v. United Bhd. of Carpenters Local 626, 306 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1962);
Russo v. Local 676, United Ass'n of Plumbing & Pipefitting Indus., 372 F. Supp. 1265,
1268 (D. Conn. 1974). Although a membership vote would not legitimize reprisals directed at
union members, it does not necessarily follow that a membership vote cannot legitimize the
retaliatory dismissal of a union official. Membership rights derive from the LMRDA, and are
therefore "inalienable." In contrast, the privilege of holding office derives from the membership, who can withdraw their consent at any time. This distinction is recognized in
§ 401(h), 29 U .S.C. § 481(h) (1970), which gives union members the right to recall their
officials.
120
See notes 52-82 and accompanying text supra. Although King involved the dismissal of
appointed grand lodge representatives, the decision of the Ninth Circuit may have been
influenced by the fact that they were removed from office by the unilateral decision of a
political opponent. See notes 40-51 and accompanying text supra. But see note 109 supra.
121
See notes 24-39 and accompanying text supra.
122
See notes 14-23 and accompanying text supra.
123
As used in this article, the term "burden of proof' means the "production burden"
rather than the "persuasion burden." See generally C. McCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 336 (2d
ed. 1972).
124
Once a violation of Title I or§ 609 is established, aggrieved officials should be entitled to the panoply of remedies normally available under these sections, including injunctions, compensatory damages, and attorney's fees. See Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. I
(1973); Simmons v. Avisco, Local 713, Textile Workers, 350 F.2d 1012, 1018-19 (4th Cir.
1965); McCraw v. Plumbers, 341 F.2d 705, 710 (6th Cir. 1965); 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1970).
125
See Retail Clerks Local 648 v. Retail Clerks Int'I Ass'n, 299 F. Supp. 1012, 1020
(D.D.C. 1969); Note, supra note 5, at 609.

WINTER

1977)

Reprisal Discharges of Union Officials

295

justifiable grounds for discharge, such as incompetence or malfeasance, a union official would still be entitled to relief so long as one
reason for his discharge was the exercise of protected rights. 126
Another approach would find that dismissals of union officials
violate the LMRDA only when they would not have been discharged "but for" the exercise of Title I rights. 127 This standard
would accord greater weight to the legitimate institutional interests
of unions by denying relief to deposed officials whenever there was
a justifiable ground for the discharge . 128 A third approach would
balance the various motivations behind dismissals of union officials, finding a violation of the LMRDA whenever the predominant
motivation was the exercise of Title I rights.
Since plaintiffs generally have the burden of proof in actions
arising under Title I and section 609, deposed union officials should
be required to demonstrate that their dismissals were retaliatory.
When the circumstances strongly suggest that a union official was
discharged for exercising Title I rights, such as a dismissal occurring shortly after a union election, 129 it may be appropriate to shift
the burden to the union by establishing a rebuttable presumption
that the discharge was unlawful. 130 In addition to recognizing the
likelihood that the dismissal constitutes a reprisal for the exercise
of Title I rights, the establishment of such a presumption would
reflect the fact that the union usually has better access to the
relevant information. 131

IV. CONCLUSION

The federal courts are divided over whether reprisal discharges
of union officials violate the provisions of the LMRDA. The statutory language, legislative history, and fundamental purposes of
the LMRDA lend support to both positions. In deciding whether

126
The National Labor Relations Board has applied a "substantial degree" test in determining whether the termination of employees violates section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970). See NLRB v. Great E. Color Lithographic
Corp., 309 F.2d 352, 355 (2d Cir. 1962); NLRB v. Whitin Mach. Works, 204 F.2d 883 (1st
Cir. 1953); NLRB v. Electric City Dyeing Co., 178 F.2d 980 (3d Cir. 1950).
127
See generally Leslie, supra note 10, at 1326.
128 In applying a "but for" standard, the courts would have to scrutinize the institutional
justifications offered by unions in order to ensure that they were not fabricated for the
purpose of avoiding liability.
129
Where there is a history of factionalism in the union, see Schonfeld v. Penza, 477 F.2d
899 (2d Cir. 1973), it may also be proper to shift the burden of proof to the union.
130
See Retail Clerks Local 648 v. Retail Clerks Int'! Ass'n, 299 F. Supp. 1012, 1019
(D.D.C. 1969); Note, supra note 5, at 608.
131
See generally C. McCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 343 (2d ed. 1972).
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reprisal discharges violate the LMRDA, the courts should focus on
two factors: the position occupied by the deposed official and the
process by which the official was removed from office. The courts
should adopt the positions that elected officers cannot be removed
from office for exercising protected rights, except by vote of the
membership, but appointed officials may be discharged for any
reason. The courts will then have to resolve the problems of
formulating procedures for implementing this principle.
-Alan V. Reuther

